compounded the danger. Taken one by one, democratic individuals were but motes to the central government; only in association did they acquire a political potency comparable to that of the old nobility. As Tocqueville remarked in the introduction to Democracy in America, "Citizens joined together in free association might … replace the individual power of nobles, and the state would be protected against tyranny and license." 2 Even as Tocqueville was putting the finishing touches on the manuscript of the first volume of Democracy, to be published in or free association capable of representing that opinion and enabling it to act?" 3 Here, the mention of the number "twenty" evokes the legal definition of an association in France. 4 The terms in which Tocqueville states his objection to the law of 1834 indicate the grounds of his rupture with the traditionalist conservatism of his day. In presenting the proposed law to the Chamber, Barthe, the minister of justice at the time, had made clear the government's belief that to tolerate illegal associations was to empower "'a sort of insurrectional government' representing a minority of society that had allegedly 'declared war on the mores and laws of the vast majority.'" 5 Like Tocqueville, Barthe perceived a link between association, envisioned as organized public opinion, and the ability to act politically, but he deemed any such action, when not sanctioned by the state itself, to be "insurrectional," a form of "declared war" against the "majority," and therefore to be resisted by repressive force.
Tocqueville, by contrast, looked forward to a republican regime, where by "republic" he meant "the slow and tranquil action of society on itself." 6 The ability to act politically resides, however, not with individuals but with "people united by a common bond," that is, with "free associations." Barthe views the development of any ability to act politically without state sanction as potentially insurrectionary, whereas Tocqueville, already looking beyond the crises of the early July Monarchy to a future democratic republic in France, sees it as essential to the health of public mores and to the political maturity of a people. as in aristocratic societies "but … small sacrifices every day." 9 One might gloss this remark by saying that a proper Tocquevillean democrat seeks not to maximize his satisfaction at any given time but rather to forgo some measure of gratification in order to forestall the growth in others of resentments that might threaten his future well-being. This doctrine appears to have some affinity with the Rawlsian maximin criterion 10 that the best-off ought to be required to sacrifice only as necessary to make the condition of the worst-off tolerable should Fate's lottery force them to endure that condition themselves: "The doctrine of self-interest properly understood may prevent a few men from climbing high above the ordinary level of humanity, but a great many others who used to fall below that level will rise to it and remain there. Consider a few individuals and the doctrine brings them down. Think of the species and the doctrine raises it up." 11 In thinking about associations, Tocqueville anticipated Mancur
Olson as well as John Rawls. He identified what has come to be known as the collective action problem: "When the bonds among men cease to be solid and permanent, it is impossible to get large numbers of them to act in common without persuading each person whose cooperation is required that self-interest obliges him to join his efforts voluntarily to those of all the others." He was perhaps too sanguine in his belief that newspapers could resolve this problem owing to their ability to "deposit the same thought in a thousand minds at once," although, to be sure, press organs in Jacksonian America played a role quite different from the role they play today. 12 Tocqueville further argued that association helps to stabilize democracy in two ways. First, it enables the "citizens of the minority … to ascertain their numerical strength and thereby weaken the moral ascendancy of the majority," thus presumably moderating the eagerness of the majority to impose its will and encouraging temperate compromise. 13 Second, it promotes competition of ideas and sorts out those with the greatest popular appeal.
If the bond of association were no stronger than the bond of a common idea, however, the fact of association would have seemed neither so great a threat to Barthe and the government nor so hopeful a promise to Tocqueville. The specific virtue of association was to give animating warmth to ideas so as to resurrect the social body from the democratic dust: in association "men can see one another … and exchange views with a forcefulness and warmth that the written word can never achieve." In the political realm they can form parties to give force, scope, and longevity to ideas of public good. 14 Thus for Tocqueville an association was an idea made flesh.
The idea in its comprehensive and reciprocal inclusiveness was what lifted the association above the mere material solidarity of the interest group or faction 15 and made it not a divisive organ of exclusive self-regard but a unifying agent of republican virtue and enlightenment. Here again the analogy with nobility shaped his thinking, for it was his conceit that in aristocratic society the "official doctrine" was "that it is glorious to forget oneself and proper to do good without self-interest." 16 The tendentious hyperbole in this "official" representation of noble instinct, honor, and self-sacrifice was transferred to associations: if the powerful obligingly served the powerless in the aristocratic republic, in the democratic republic the power of ideas lifted isolated individuals out of the dust and allowed them to serve themselves whenever it enabled them to "see one another" with the "forcefulness and warmth" that had formerly been supplied by the supposed organic solidarity of a hierarchical social organization. Now, it is curious, given the importance that Tocqueville attached to voluntary association, that in all of the Democracy he supplies one and only one example of a voluntary political association that is not a political party. 17 A party is a kind of association, but since its purpose is to exercise power through the state, it cannot fulfill the defensive role that Tocqueville wants to ascribe to associations as bulwarks against the state's potentially liberticide encroachments. Although he has some astute remarks to make about parties, his lapidary judgment that "parties are an evil inherent in free governments" 18 seems all but oblivious of his previous defense of political associations as a positive good, not least for their role in building trust that spills over into civil society. 19 Although I cannot pursue the distinction between parties and other forms of political association in depth here, I want to suggest that it is an important distinction to fathom if we wish to grasp Tocqueville's view of democracy and some of the limitations inherent in that view.
The one non-party political association that Tocqueville did discuss was the free-trade convention convened in Philadelphia in 1831. 20 In some respects this example offers a good illustration of his general thesis about associations: the convention was organized around an idea, and the publicity afforded by newspapers played a crucial role in bringing together people from different sections of the country and walks of life. It also exemplified the deferential form of political leadership that Tocqueville preferred, in that "distinguished men … devoted all their efforts to moderating the convention's rhetoric and limiting its objectives." 21 In other respects, however, the example is problematic. The free-trade idea was hardly of a nature to encourage the exaltation of fellow-feeling above material selfinterest. It rather abetted the peculiarly American tendency to translate matters of economic interest into questions of constitutional principle, in this case of states' rights and implied powers. In his discussion of the convention, moreover, Tocqueville explicitly opposed party to association on the grounds that under the spoils system central to the Jacksonian conception of party "all public power passes into [the victorious party's] hands" with the election of a president, thus contributing to the "omnipotence of the majority" and justifying the recourse to the "dangerous means" of association to oppose it. 22 In this passage Tocqueville seems to suggest that the victorious Democracy opposed tariff reductions, which was of course not the case. Interestingly, when he returned to the tariff question at the end of Book I, he gave a fuller and more accurate account. 23 Earlier, moreover, he observed that associations were subject to co-optation by states (or, implicitly, by blocs of states or politicians purporting to speak for such blocs, as Calhoun did on the tariff issue), thus blurring the distinction between party and association or state and social movement. 24 The most crucial flaw in Tocqueville's account of the free-trade convention, however, is his failure to consider the possible encouragement it gave to armed insurrection. He notes that Congress, "having failed to listen to its suppliant subjects, … began to heed their complaints when it saw them take up arms." 25 Page 14 The allusion is of course to the mustering of the South Carolina 
